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Abstract Data outsourcing service can shift the local data
storage and maintenance to cloud service provider (CSP)
to ease the burden from data owner, but it brings the data
security threats as CSP is always considered to honest-
but-curious. Therefore, searchable encryption (SE) tech-
nique which allows cloud clients (including data owner
and data user) to securely search over ciphertext through
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keywords and selectively retrieve files of interest is of prime
importance. However, in practice, data user’s access per-
mission always dynamically varies with data owner’s pref-
erences. Moreover, existing SE schemes which are based
on attribute-based encryption (ABE) incur heavy compu-
tational burden through attribution revocation and policy
updating. To allow data owner to flexibly grant access per-
missions, we design a secure cryptographic primitive called
as efficient data owner authorized search over encrypted
data scheme through utilizing identity-based encryption
(IBE) technique. The formal security analysis proves that
our scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)
and chosen-keyword attack (CKA) without random ora-
cle. Besides, empirical experiments over real-world dataset
show that our scheme is efficient and feasible with regard to
data access control.
Keywords Cloud computing · Searchable encryption ·
Data owner authorized search · Chosen-plaintext attack ·
Chosen-keyword attack
1 Introduction
Cloud computing [1, 2] develops rapidly due to its long
list of unprecedented advantages (such as low maintenance
cost, ubiquitous network access, on-demand service, etc),
but it still brings new and challenging security issues [3, 4]
over outsourced data due to the honest-but-curious CSP [5].
To reduce heavy local data maintenance and computation
burden, both individuals and Information Technology (IT)
enterprises prefer to backup their sensitive data on CSP.
Encryption is trivial solution to keep data confidential-
ity, but it makes the retrieval over encrypted cloud data
Published in Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, 15 October 2016, Pages 1-12, Advance Online
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extremely difficult. Besides, simply downloading the whole
ciphertext locally is a naive solution due to computation
and bandwidth resources waste. Thus, search over encrypted
data recently has been envisioned as a critical topic which
incurs considerable amount of interest in both academia and
industry fields, and the SE technique [6, 7] which allows the
data users to securely search over ciphertext through key-
words and selectively retrieve files of interest is of prime
importance.
The SE scheme should not only protect data privacy from
CSP and unauthorized data users, but also meet the search
requirements in practice. Without the access control, the
data confidentiality cannot be guaranteed as data owners
directly lose the physical control over remote cloud data.
To the best of our knowledge, there still exist some limi-
tations in the traditional access control mechanisms due to
high system overheads. The latest cryptographic primitive
called as ABE [8, 9] is proposed and it can achieve fine-
grained access control over encrypted data. However, the
state-of-the-art SE schemes [10, 11] which are based on
ABE can only identity certain category of data users accord-
ing to descriptive attributes. Moreover, as data user’s access
permission always dynamically varies with data owner’s
preferences, these schemes ultimately incur heavy computa-
tional burden when updating access permissions. Therefore,
the practical SE scheme should support flexible access
permissions.
While the access permission which is based on spe-
cific identity instead of obscure attribute set remains to be
addressed for the sake of preventing unauthorized accesses.
As far as we know, existing SE schemes can allow autho-
rized data user to issue search queries with the help of CSP.
However, in practice, we should place the duty of access
control enforcement on data owners due to semi-trusted
CSP. Moreover, traditional SE schemes need to build secure
channel between data user and CSP, thereby incurring much
more communication overhead. Therefore, supporting free
secure channel [12, 13] remains an overarching concern
in this field. As data user’s access privilege changes with
the DO’s preferences, our scheme should provide direct
access control to prevent unauthorized access. Besides, as
the existing SE schemes have inherent defects, our scheme
should resist CKA without random oracle. To tackle afore-
mentioned problems, we propose a Data-Owner Authorized
Search (DOAS) over encrypted data scheme based on IBE.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as
follows:
1) Direct authorization. In the semi-trusted cloud com-
puting environment, our scheme can provide direct
control access so that data owner dynamically decides
data user’s access permission rather than fuzzy attribute
set.
2) Security without random oracle. For data security con-
cerns, our scheme is secure against CPA and CKA
without random oracle.
3) Efficient and feasible. Without secure channel, our
scheme is more efficient and feasible in practice than
existing SE schemes which are based on ABE.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the previous work associated with DOAS
scheme. Section 3 gives the preliminaries used in DOAS
scheme. The problem formulation (such as system model,
threat model, design goals, scheme definition and security
model) is shown in Section 4, followed by Section 5 which
demonstrates the concrete construction of DOAS scheme.
Section 6 analyzes the DOAS scheme in terms of cor-
rectness, security and performance. Section 7 draws some
concluding remarks.
2 Related work
With the growing awareness of data privacy-preserving,
a considerable number of data owners are motivated to
outsource data on CSP to reduce heavy computational bur-
den. Aiming at achieving secure and efficient search over
encrypted data, SE technique [14–17] becomes increasingly
popular among enterprises and individuals. Until now, abun-
dant privacy-preserving SE schemes have achieved a variety
of search functionalities, such as single keyword search [18–
20], multiple keywords search [21, 22], ranked search [23–
25]. However, a major defect is that these schemes need a
secure channel between CSP and data users, which is costly
and not feasible in actual applications. Moreover, in cloud
computing environment data users are actually granted dif-
ferent access privileges specified by data owners. Although
there exists a significant amount of work focusing on access
control over encrypted data, providing the access control
enforcement remains to be addressed.
To the best of our knowledge, existing SE schemes can
be categorized into key-based access control (KBAC) and
attribute-based access control (ABAC). The former usually
directly assigns decryption keys to authorized data users,
thus it may incur heavy key management burden on data
owners. And the latter exploits attribute-based encryption
(ABE) techniques [8, 9] to specify access policy for data
or secret keys. In ABE the private key and ciphertext are
associated with attributes or access policy, respectively, only
there is a match between attributes and access policy data
users can decrypt encrypted data. Existing ABE schemes
can be roughly categorized into key-policy ABE [8] (KP-
ABE, i.e. the key is associated with access policy and
ciphertext is embedded with attribute) or ciphertext-policy
ABE [9] (CP-ABE, contrary to KP-ABE).
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However, there still exist some concerns when com-
pletely placing search operation and access control enforce-
ment on CSP. For the sake of security, we should separate
the search operation from access control enforcement. The
most practical SE schemes [10, 11] can only identity certain
category of data users according to descriptive attributes.
Moreover, updating access permissions (such as attribute
revocation and policy updating) will result in heavy com-
putational burden. Thus in actual applications, data owners
should be personally involved in privilege authentication
to guarantee data confidentiality and avoid unauthorized
accesses.
Aiming at supporting exact access authorization, we uti-
lize IBE technique to achieve this goal. Since the first
IBE cryptographic primitive was proposed, vast follow-up
works [26–28] have focused on secure distributed storage
model to conquer data privacy disclosure threats. In IBE,
public key can be denoted as an arbitrary string and the
secret key is launched by the third trusted server. More-
over, two parties who have direct interaction can eliminate
the public key certificates. Through extending the IBE
scheme [26] to SE scheme, we propose an efficient DOAS
scheme to tackle the problems of access control enforce-
ment and illegal accesses.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some necessary cryptographic
background associated with DOAS scheme.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Map) Let G1,G2 be two multi-
plicative cyclic groups of prime order q, g be a generator of
G1. Then e : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear map such that
for all u, v ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q , e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
This bilinearity implies that for any a, b, c ∈ G1, e(ab, c) =
e(a, c) · e(b, c). Besides, there exists an efficiently com-
putable algorithm for computing e and the bilinear map
should be nontrivial, i.e., e is nondegenerate: e(g, g) = 1,
where “1” is the identity element in G1.
Definition 2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(DBDH) Assumption) Given the bilinear map parameters
(G1,G2, e, q, g) and random elements a, b, c, d ∈ Z∗q ,
if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A can distinguish (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc)
from (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)d) with the advantage
AdvDBDHA (k) = |Pr[A(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc)] −
Pr[A(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)d)]| ≥ (k), then we say the
DBDH assumption relative to G1 holds.
Definition 3 (Truncated Decisional p-Augmented
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (p-ABDHE)
Assumption) Given the bilinear map parameters
(G1,G2, e, q, g) and random elements a, b, c, d ∈ Z∗q ,
if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A can solve truncated decisional p-
ABDHE problem with the advantage AdvA(k) =
|Pr[A(g, ga, ..., gap , gb, gbap+2 , e(g, g)bap+1) = 1] −
Pr[A(g, ga, ..., gap , gb, gbap+2 , e(g, g)c) = 1]| ≥ (k),
then we say truncated decisional p-ABDHE assumption
relative to G1 holds.
4 Problem formulation
4.1 System model & threat model
In this section, we consider a cloud storage system involv-
ing with four main entities (namely data owner, data user,
key generation server and CSP) which are illustrated in
Fig. 1. Data owner (DO) encrypts data and builds indexes
before outsourcing ciphertext to CSP, CSP stores data and
conducts search operations, key generation server (KGS)
is responsible for distributing keys for cloud clients and
CSP, and authorized data user (DU) can issue search queries
according to specified keyword. Once DU is proved to be
legitimate by the DO, then CSP returns the relevant cipher-
text to DU. One thing to note is that the cloud clients include
DO and DU.
Like most of previous SE schemes, CSP is assumed to
be honest-but-curious. Specifically, CSP honestly follows
the designated protocols in general, but it is still anxious to
deduce as much as sensitive information. Besides, KGS and
authorized DU are believed to be fully trusted entities, and
CSP cannot collude with DU.
Data owner Data user
Key generation server
Cloud service provider
Key distribution
Certification validation
Ciphertext and index uploading
Ciphertext retrieval
Fig. 1 The framework of our proposed scheme
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4.2 Design goals
To achieve data-owner authorized search over encrypted
data, DOAS scheme should meet the following design
goals:
1) Data security and privacy. The unauthorized access
should be impeded by CSP and DO to guarantee data
security and privacy. Besides, the privacy of search
query should be protected against chosen-keyword
attack.
2) Direct access control. Independent of the third-party
server, DO should be able to directly decide DU’s
access privilege so as to avoid unauthorized accesses.
3) Secure channel-free. As building secure channel will
incur heavy computational costs, DOAS scheme should
remove the high-cost secure channel.
4) Efficiency and feasibility. Comparing with the state-of-
the-art SE schemes, DOAS scheme should be efficient
and feasible in practical applications.
4.3 Definition of DOAS scheme
In this paper the symbol x ∈ X is denoted as randomly
selecting an element x from the set X. For the integer S, the
symbol [S] is denoted as an integer set {1, 2, · · · , S}. Let an
integer k be the security level, id be an identity which is an
n-bit string, W,M be keyword and message space, respec-
tively. DOAS scheme includes seven algorithms which are
demonstrated in Definition 1.
Definition 4 (DOAS scheme) DOAS scheme is a tuple
(Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Trap, Search, Verify, Dec) of seven
polynomial-time algorithms which are shown as follows:
(1) Setup(1k) → (pk,msk). Given a security parameter
k, KGS runs this probabilistic algorithm to generate
public key pk and master key msk, where msk is
owned by itself.
(2) KeyGen(pk,msk) → (pks, sks, pkc, skc). KGS per-
forms this probabilistic algorithm to return pub-
lic/secret key pairs {(pks, sks), (pkc, skc)} for CSP
and cloud client, respectively.
(3) Enc(m,w, id, pk, pkc, pks) → (C, I ). DO whose
identity is id first extracts keyword w ∈ W from the
message m ∈ M , then he runs this probabilistic algo-
rithm to encrypt message m as C and build index I for
it, finally he sends the tuple (C, I ) to CSP.
(4) Trap(w′, skc, pk) → (Tw′). DU runs this probabilis-
tic algorithm to generate a search token (trapdoor) Tw′
based on his submitted keyword w′ and send it to CSP.
(5) Search(Tw′ , I, C, pk, sks) → C′. Once gaining the
trapdoor Tw′ , CSP runs this deterministic algorithm
to check whether the trapdoor Tw′ matches with the
index I . If Tw′ matches with I , CSP outputs the rel-
evant results C′. Otherwise, CSP outputs ⊥. Before
returning C′ to DU, CSP asks DU to submit his Proof
information to check his legality.
(6) Verify(skc, P roof ) → {0, 1}. If Tw′ matches with I
in Search algorithm, then DO continues to run this
probabilistic algorithm; otherwise, it abolishes. If the
Proof information submitted by DU is legitimate,
then CSP returns the relevant Ciphertext C′ to DU.
Otherwise, CSP rejects it. Where “1” means that DU
passes the DO’s verification and gains the relevant
ciphertext C′, “0” means that DU is not an authorized
entity and gains ⊥.
(7) Dec(C′, skc, pkc) → m. DU runs this determinis-
tic algorithm to decrypt ciphertext C′ and gain the
plaintext m through his secret key skc.
Different from previous schemes, DOAS scheme not
only supports secure channel-free during search procedure,
but also it can accurately grant DU’s access permission.
4.4 Security model
In this section, we formalize the security models of DOAS
scheme through the indistinguishability chosen-keyword
attack (IND-DOAS-CKA) and indistinguishability chosen-
plaintext attack (IND-DOAS-CPA). Informally, IND-CKA
security can prevent internal malicious CSP to gain the
trapdoor for the specified keyword. Moreover, CSP cannot
distinguish which ciphertext corresponds to which keyword.
The IND-DOAS-CKA game is presented as follows:
Definition 5 (IND-DOAS-CKA game) Let k be the secu-
rity parameter, then the IND-DOAS-CKA is defined by the
following game between an adversaryA and a challenger C.
– Setup. Give the public key pk and master key msk,
C first runs KeyGen algorithm to generate public
and secret key pairs {(pks, sks), (pkc, skc)} for cloud
client and CSP, respectively. Then C sends the tuple
{pks, sks), pkc} to A.
– Phase 1. A issues search queries for a set of keywords
W = {w1, ..., wt }, then each keyword wi ∈ W is
handled by the following algorithm.
−T rap(wi).A can adaptively issue trapdoor Twi for
any keyword wi ∈ W , then C performs this algorithm
and returns trapdoor Twi to A.
– Challenge. After Phase 1 is over, A outputs a tar-
get keyword pair (w0, w1). There exists a restriction
that none of keywords (w0, w1) has been queried
in Phase 1. C responses it through selecting a ran-
dom bit b ∈ {0, 1}, then C returns the target index
Ib to A.
Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl.
– Phase 2. A again issues a number of search queries
W ′ = {w′1, ..., w′t } as in Phase 1 on the condition that
w0, w1 /∈ W ′.
– Guess. A outputs his guess b′, and he wins the game if
b = b′.
We consider A as an IND-DOAS-CKA adversary,
and the advantage in attacking DOAS scheme is set as
AdvIND−DOAS−CKAA (k) = |Pr[b = b′] − 12 |.
Definition 6 (IND-DOAS-CPA game) For
Setup,KeyGen,Enc algorithms, DOAS scheme is said
to be IND-CPA secure if there exist no polynomial-time
adversaries A = (A0,A1) can win the following IND-CPA
game, which as shown in the Table 1 with an non-negligible
advantage AdvIND−DOAS−CPAA (k) = |Pr[b = b′] − 12 |.
5 Proposed DOAS scheme
To avoid fuzzy access authorization we design an efficient
DOAS scheme via IBE scheme to enhance the access con-
trol enforcement. To have a better understanding of DOAS
scheme, we first demonstrate some notations in Table 2.
5.1 Concrete construction of DOAS scheme
In this section, we detail the construction of DOAS scheme.
By efficiency, we explore to reduce the heavy computational
burden as much as possible through removing the secure
channel. By security, we aim that the legal access permis-
sion should be authorized by DO instead of CSP. Before
presenting the specific construction of DOAS scheme we
first show its basic protocol in Fig. 2.
Setup(1k) Given a security parameter k, KGS first runs
this algorithm to output the bilinear map parameters
(e, q, g,G1,G2). Let h be the hash function h : {0, 1}∗ →
Z∗q , the elements g0, g1, g2 be three generators of G1, U =
{u0, u1, ..., un} be the random element set in G1, then KGS
randomly selects α ∈ Z∗q and sets X1 = gα,X2 = gα0 . The
public key pk and master key msk are denoted by Eq. 1.
pk = {G1,G2, e, h, g, g0, g1, g2,U},msk = α. (1)
Table 1 IND-DOAS-CPA game
GameIND−CPADOAS,A (k)
(pkc, skc) ← Setup(1k); b ∈ {0, 1};
(m0,m1) ← A0(pkc); Cb ← Enc(pkc,mb);
b′ ∈ {0, 1} ← A1({Cb}pkc ); If b′ = b,A wins the game;
Table 2 Notation descriptions
Notations Descriptions
{pk,msk} Public/Master keys
{pks, sks} Public/secret key pair of CSP
{pkc, skc} Public/secret key pair of cloud client
id = {id1, · · · , idn} Identity of cloud client
V = {i} Integer set which satisfies idi = 1
m Selected message or data file
C = {c0, c1, c2} Ciphertext for m
I = {I0, I1} Index for keyword in m
Tw′ Trapdoor for queried keyword w′
C′ Returned search results
Proof DU’s proof information
KeyGen(pk,msk) For the CSP, KGS first chooses a ran-
dom element λ ∈ Z∗q and computes ϕ = gλ, then KGS
randomly selects θ ∈ G1 and sets the public/private key
pair of CSP as pks = {ϕ, θ}, sks = {λ}. While for each
cloud client, let his identity be a n-bit string, idi be the i-
th bit of id, and each index i in the set V should satisfy
idi = 1. KGS first randomly chooses μ, πid ∈ Z∗q , τ ∈ G1
and computes ψ = gμ, then he sets the public/private key
pair of cloud client as pkc = {ψ, τ, gπid , gπid0 , X1, X2},
skc = {μ, kid = gα1 (u0
∏
i∈V ui)πid }.
Enc(m,w, id, pk, pkc, pks) Given the message m, DO
whose identity is id extracts keyword w from m and builds
index for it. He first selects random elements sid , rid ∈ Z∗q
and computes β = h(e(ϕ, θ)sid ), then he sets ciphertext C
and index I as C = {c0 = gsid , c1 = m · e(X1, g1)sid , c2 =
Data Owner Cloud Service Provider Data User
Ciphertext, Index 
Search Token
Request Authentication
Submit Proof
Send Proof
Pass Verification
Matched Ciphertext
id id'
C, I
T
C'
Fig. 2 The protocol of DOAS scheme
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(u0
∏
i∈V ui)sid }, I = {I0 = grid , I1 = (ψg−w)rid/β},
respectively, finally he sends the tuple {I, C} to CSP.
Trap(w′, skc, pk) When DU whose identity is id ′ wants
to retrieve the message including keyword w′, he first
chooses random element γw′ ∈ Z∗q and computes δw′ =
(τg−γw′ )1/μ−w′ , then he returns the trapdoor Tw′ =
{γw′ , δw′ } to CSP.
Search(Tw′, I,C,pk, sks) After gaining the trapdoor
Tw′ , CSP first computes β ′ = h(e(c0, θ)λ), then he verifies
whether the Eq. 2 holds when β ′ = β,w′ = w. If Eq. 2
holds, DU needs to submit his Proof information to CSP.
Otherwise, CSP returns ⊥.
e(I
β ′
1 , δw′)e(I0, g)
γw′ = e(I0, τ ). (2)
Verify(skc, P roof ) If Eq. 2 holds, the CSP asks the DU
to submit his Proof information. DU first chooses a ran-
dom element  ∈ Z∗q and computes k′id ′ = kid ′g2,  = g0,
then DU sends Proof = {id ′, k′
id ′ , } to CSP. Finally
CSP returns Proof to DO and DO checks whether the
Eq. 3 holds. If Eq. 3 holds, DO asks CSP to return relevant
ciphertext C′ to DU. Otherwise, DU gains ⊥.
e(k′
id ′ , g0) = e(g1, X2)e(u0
∏
i∈V ui, g
πid′
0 )e(g2, ). (3)
Dec(C′, skc, pkc) DU decrypts the ciphertext C′ through
Eq. 4.
m = c1 · e(gπid , c2)/e(kid , c0). (4)
Remark To guarantee data confidentiality, unauthorized
DU should not be able to access sensitive information, only
DU passes the CSP’s search operation and DO’s verifica-
tion he can gain the relevant search results. Furthermore,
through removing the secure channel DOAS scheme can
reduce the computational costs. Therefore, in the efficient
DOAS scheme only authorized DU can pass the CSP’s
search operation and DO’s verification. Unfortunately, in
DOAS scheme DO needs to remain online, while DOAS
scheme can effectively reduce the computational costs.
Therefore, it is a tradeoff between computational burden and
communication costs.
6 The analysis of DOAS scheme
6.1 Correctness
Only the DU’s search token is correctly tested by CSP and
his Proof information passes the DO’s authorization he can
gain the relevant ciphertext. So the correctness of Search
and Verify algorithms can be checked as follow:
According to β = h(e(ϕ, θ)sid ) = h(e(gλ, θ)sid ) and
β ′ = h(e(c0, θ)λ) = h(e(gsid , θ)λ), we have β ′ = β. First,
we show Eq. 2 holds when w = w′.
e(I
β ′
1 , δw′) = e(g(μ−w)rid , (τg−γw′ )1/μ−w
′
)
= e(g, τ )rid e(g, g−γw′ )rid ;
e(I0, g)
γw′ = e(grid , g)γw′ ;
e(I
β ′
1 , δw′)e(I0, g)
γw′ = e(g, τ )rid = e(grid , τ ) = e(I0, τ ).
Second, We verify the legitimacy of DU if Eq. 3 holds.
e(k′id ′ , g0) = e(kid ′g2, g0) = e(gα1 (u0
∏
i∈V
ui)
πid′g2, g0)
= e(g1, gα0 )e(u0
∏
i∈V
ui, g
πid′
0 )e(g2, g

0)
= e(g1, X2)e(u0
∏
i∈V
ui, g
πid′
0 )e(g2, ).
Finally, DU can decrypt the returned ciphertext through (4).
c1 · e(g
πid , c2)
e(kid , c0)
= m· e(X1, g1)
sid · e(gπid , (u0 ∏i∈V ui)sid )
e(gα1 (u0
∏
i∈V ui)πid }, gsid )
= m· e(g
α, g1)
sid
e(gα1 , g
sid )
= m.
6.2 Security
In this section, we first analyze the security of our proposed
DOAS scheme and show it coincides with the design goals
presented in Section 4.
Theorem 1 DOAS scheme is (t, q1, q2, (k)) secure against
indistinguishability chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) if
the (t ′, (k)′)-DBDH assumption holds in the bilinear
map (e, p,G1,G2). Where t ′ = t + O(t), (k)′ =
(k)
32(n+1)(q1+2q2) .
Proof Similar to the proof process in IBE scheme [26],
we assume that there exists an (t, q1, q2, (k))-adversary A
can break the IND-CPA security of DOAS scheme, then
we construct a simulator B which can utilize A to break
the DBDH assumption. Given security parameter k, the
challenger C first generates the bilinear map parameters
(e, p, g,G1,G2) ← G(1k), then it flips a coin with  ∈
{0, 1}. If  = 0, it sends the tuple (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) to
B; if  = 1, it returns the tuple (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)d) to B,
where d ∈ Z∗q . Finally, B outputs his guess ′ on .
Setup B first sets  = 4(q1 + 2q2) and selects a random
integer Int ∈ [n]. Then he chooses two integrity vectors−→
ν′ = {ν1, ..., νn},−→μ′ = {μ1, ..., μn}, where νi ∈ [ −
1], μi ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, 2, ..., n. Finally, he randomly selects
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ν0 ∈ [ − 1], μ0 ∈ Z∗q and defines three functions through
Eq. 5.
f1(id) = (q − Int) + ν0 + ∑i∈V νi;
f2(id) = μ0 + ∑i∈V μi;
f3(id) =
{
0, if ν0 + ∑i∈V νi ≡ 0(mod )
1, if ν0 + ∑i∈V νi ≡ 0(mod ) .
(5)
Besides, B randomly selects ϑ ∈ Z∗q , g2 ∈ G1, and sets
ga = gα = X1, gb = g1, g0 = gϑ,X2 = gα0 = gαϑ, u0 =
g
(q−Int)+ν0
1 g
μ0 , ui = gνi1 gμi . Then B publishes the tuple
(e, q,G1,G2, g, g0, g1, g2, X1, X2,U) and computes gα1 =
gbα .
Phase 1 This phase includes the following two kind of
queries:
Key generation query.: When A issues the key query for
the DU with an identity id, B first verifies the equation
f3(id)
?= 1.
– If f3(id) = 1 holds, B first randomly chooses π ∈ Z∗q ,
then he generates the DU’s key as follows:
kid = X
−f2(id)
f1(id)
1 (ν0
∏
i∈V νi)π ;
gπ = X
−1
f1(id)
1 g
π
0 , g
π
0 = gϑπ .
(6)
Finally, B sends the tuple (kid , gπ , gπ0 ) to A.
– If f3(id) = 0 holds, B aborts this process and randomly
returns his guess ′. And we claim the key for DU with
an identity id is generated correctly, which is shown by
Eq. 7.
kid = X
−f2(id)
f1(id)
1 (μ0
∏
i∈V μi)π
= g
−af2(id)
f1(id) (gbf1(id)+f2(id))π
= (gbf1(id)+f2(id)) −af1(id) gab(gbf1(id)+f2(id))π
= (gbf1(id)+f2(id))π− af1(id) gab
= ga1 (μ0
∏
i∈V μi)
π− a
f1(id) .
(7)
Set π̂ = π − a
f1(id)
and gain Eq. 8.
kid = ga1 (μ0
∏
i∈V μi)
π− a
f1(id) ;
gπ = X
−1
f1(id)
1 g
π
0 = gπ−
a
f1(id) = gπ̂ ;
gπ0 = gϑπ = gϑπ̂ = gπ̂0 .
(8)
Thus, the key for DU is correctly generated according to
above analysis.
Verify query: A issues verify queries on (id, id ′), then B
first confirms whether he has generated keys for DUs with
identities id and id ′. If not, he needs to verify whether the
equations f1(id) = 1, f1(id ′) = 1 hold.
If above two equations hold, B first computes the keys
kid , kid ′ for identities id, id ′, respectively. Then he selects a
random element  ∈ Z∗q and computes k′id ′ = kid ′g2,  =
g0. Finally, he returns (k
′
id ′ , ) to A. Otherwise, he termi-
nates this process and randomly outputs his guess ′.
Challenge A issues an identity id∗ and two messages
m0,m1 which have equal length. Then B verifies f3(id∗) ?=
0.
– If f3(id∗) = 1, B terminates the subsequent processes
and randomly outputs his guess ′.
– If f3(id∗) = 0, B first flips a coin with b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Then he generates the ciphertext through Eq. 9,
c∗0 = gc, c∗1 = mb′e(g, g)d,
c∗2 = gcf2(id
∗) = u0 ∏i∈V∗ uci .
(9)
Finally, B sends the ciphertext C∗ = {c∗0, c∗1, c∗2} for the
message mb′ to A.
Phase 2 The process of this phase is the same as Phase 1
except for some restrictions as follows:
Key generation query. The key for the identity id∗ cannot
be issued by A.
Verify query. A cannot issue verify query for the tuple
(id, id ′, c∗0) and key query for identity id∗.
Guess A first outputs his guess b′′ on b′. If b′′ = b′ , B
returns ′ = 0. Otherwise, ′ = 1.
From aforementioned processes we notice that the simu-
lation of key generation verify queries is analogous to that
in real protocol. And the B will not abort the simulation
if and only if the key for DU is correctly generated and
f3(id
∗) = 0. For q1 key generation queries and q2 verify
queries, B is required to create at most q1 + 2q2. There-
fore, A has at least (k)′ = (k)32(n+1)(q1+2q2) advantage to
break the DBDH assumption. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 DOAS scheme is secure against indistinguisha-
bility chosen-keyword attack (IND-CKA) without random
oracle if truncated decisional p-ABDHE assumption is
intractable.
Proof Assume that the number of trapdoor queries pk sat-
isfies p ≥ pk + 1, and there exists a polynomial-time
adversaryA who can attack DOAS scheme without random
oracle, then we construct a simulator B that can simulate the
p-ABDHE game. The challenger C generates the bilinear
map parameters (G1,G2, q, g, e), and a p-ABDHE instance
(g, ga, ga
2
, ..., ga
p
, gb, gba
p+2
,D) is returned by B, then
B’s goal is to distinguish D = e(g, g)bap+1 from a random
element in G2. Finally, the simulation proceeds are shown
as follows:
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Setup Given the security parameter k and public parame-
ters (G1,G2, q, g, e, h), B first chooses random elements
λ ∈ Z∗q , θ ∈ G1 and computes ϕ = gλ, then he sets the
public/secret key pair of CSP as pks = (ϕ, θ), sks = (λ),
respectively. In the same way, B first chooses a random ele-
ment μ and a p-degree polynomial p(a); then he computes
ψ ′ = ga, τ = gp(a); finally, he sends partial public key
pkc = (ψ, τ) of cloud client to A.
Phase 1 A adaptively makes pk trapdoor generation
queries. When A issues the trapdoor query for the keyword
w′, B first computes γw′ = p(w′), δw′ = (τg−γw′ )1/μ−w′ ,
then he sends Tw′ = {γw′, δw′ } toA. If p ≥ pk +1, then γw′
is a random element from the view ofA as p(x) is a random
p-degree polynomial.
Challenge When Phase 1 is over, A outputs two keywords
w′0, w′1. Then B first selects a random element b ∈ {0, 1},
then he sets w∗ = w′b, γw∗ = p(w∗) and computes
δw∗ = g(p(a)−p(w∗))/(a−w∗). Finally, he selects random ele-
ments s∗id , r∗id ∈ Z∗q and computes I ∗0 = gs
∗
id , β∗ =
h(e(ϕ, θ)s
∗
id ), he also defines a (p + 1)-degree random
polynomial p∗(a) = (ap+2 − (w∗)p+2)/(a − w∗) =
∑p+1
i=0 p∗i (ai). Finally, he needs to compute Eq. 10.
I ∗1 = (gba
p+2
(gb)−(w′)p+2)1/β∗ ,
e(g, g)r
∗
id = Dp∗p+1e(gb,∏pi=0(ga
i
)p
∗
i ),
e(g, τ )r
∗
id = e((I ∗1 )β
∗
, δw∗)(e(g, g)r
∗
id )γw∗ .
(10)
Besides, he sends the index (I∗0 , I ∗1 ) toA. Set r∗id = bp∗(a),
if D = e(g, g)bap+1 , then Eq. 11 holds.
I ∗1 = (gba
p+2
(gb)−(w∗)p+2)1/β∗
= g(a−w∗)(b(ap+1−(w∗)p+2)/(a−w∗))1/β∗
= ga−w∗r∗id /β∗ = (ψ ′g−w∗)r∗id /β∗ .
(11)
Phase 2 A repeatedly issues the trapdoor generation
queries as Phase 1 except for the keywords (w′0, w′1).
Guess A returns the guess b′. If b′ = b, set D =
e(g, g)ba
p+1
; otherwise, set D = e(g, g)c.
If D = e(g, g)bap+1 , we argue that the simulation is
perfect, and A can correctly guess the bit b with proba-
bility 1/2 + (k). Otherwise, the element D is uniformly
distributed, and (I ∗1 , e(g, g)
r∗id ) is a uniformly random
and independent tuple. In this situation, the inequality
e(g, g)r
∗
id = (e(g, ((I ∗1 )β
∗
))1/a−w∗ holds with probability
1−1/q. If the above inequality holds, the uniformly random
element can be set through Eq. 12.
e(g, τ )r
∗
id = e((I ∗1 )β
∗
, δw∗)(e(g, g)r
∗
id )γw∗
= e((I∗1 )β
∗
,τ 1/a−w∗ )(e(g,g)r
∗
id )
(e(g,(I∗1 )β
∗
))1/a−w∗ )γw∗ .
(12)
And this element is also independent from the view of A
as the element γw∗ is uniformly random. Especially, γw∗ =
p(w∗) (except for e(g, g)r∗id ) is random and independent
from the view of A when p ≥ pk + 1. Therefore, e(g, τ )r∗id
is a uniformly random and independent element. Addition-
ally, I ∗0 is also uniformly random and independent from the
tuple (I ∗1 ), e(g, g)
r∗id , e(g, τ )r
∗
id ) as s∗id ∈ Z∗q is randomly
selected. Thus the index cannot reveal any valuable infor-
mation regarding on the bit b. This completes the proof of
Theorem 2.
6.3 Performance
In this section, we evaluate the performance of DOAS
scheme in terms of asymptotic computation complexity and
its actual execution time through exploiting the Type A
curves within the Paring Based Cryptography (PBC) library.
The experiments are implemented on an Ubuntu 15.04
Server with Intel Core i5 Processor 2.3 GHz through using
C and PBC Library. In PBC Library, the Type A is denoted
as E(Fq) : y2 = x3 + x, G1 is a subgroup of E(Fq), and
the cyclic group is a subgroup of E(Fq)2, where q is a large
prime number. The group order of G1 is 160-bit, and the
base field is 512-bit. Before showing the asymptotic compu-
tational complexity of DOAS scheme, we consider several
computational operations (e.g. exponentiation operation e1
in G1, exponentiation operation e2 in G2, hash operation h1
which maps a bit-string to an element of G1, pairing opera-
tion p, and hash operation h2 which maps a bit-string to an
element of Zq , where h2 is much more efficient than other
operations).
To show the performance of our scheme, we compare it
with the state-of-the-art schemes which are based on ABE,
such as ABKS-UR scheme [10], CP-ABKS scheme [11],
Table 3 Asymptotic performance analysis
Scheme KeyGen Enc Trap Search
DOAS 6e1 5e1 + 2e2 + 2p + h2 2e1 4p + e1 + 2e2 + h2
CP-ABKS (2m + 1)e1 + mh1 (2n + 5)e1 + nh1 + h2 (2m + 4)e1 + h2 4p + me1
ABKS-UR (2n + 1)e1 + e2 (n + 1)e1 + e2 (2n + 1)e1 (n + 1)p + e2
n: number of attributes in system; m: number of attributes submitted by DU
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etc. CP-ABKS scheme is selectively secure against chosen-
keyword attack (CKA) in the generic bilinear group model,
but its security is not based on the well-studied complexity-
theoretic problem. Though ABKS-UR scheme can achieve
stronger security in the standard model and provider
data owner-enforced search authorization, the computa-
tional costs of its algorithms are affected by the number
of attributes in system, which leads to heavy computa-
tional burden. Besides, the access permissions of these two
schemes depend on the obscure attribute set rather than the
specific identity. Thus, our scheme which can resist chosen-
plaintext attack (CPA) and CKA without random oracle is
feasible in practical applications. As a further contribution,
we show that the actual performance of our scheme is more
efficient than those of aforementioned two schemes through
conducting empirical experiments over real-world dataset.
Next, we give the asymptotic computational complexities of
CP-ABKS scheme, ABKS-UR scheme and our scheme, as
illustrated in Table 3.
In Table 3, we mainly take four algorithms into consider-
ation, namely KeyGen, Enc, Trap and Search algorithms.
For convenience, we set n = 50,m = 10. We notice that our
scheme is more efficient than other two schemes as the com-
putational costs of these two schemes are affected by the
factors n,m, respectively, where m  n. However, ABKS-
UR scheme will outperform other two schemes in Trap and
Search algorithms when the number of submitted keywords
is over a certain threshold, as our scheme and CP-ABKS
scheme cannot support multi-keyword search. Therefore,
our scheme is efficient and feasible in practical applications
to some extent.
Next we conduct empirical study over a real-world
dataset, namely email dataset,1 to demonstrate the perfor-
mance evaluation of aforementioned three schemes. For
comparison, we set m = 10, n = 50. Besides, we randomly
choose 10000 files (in which each file has 1000 distinct
keyword fields) and run experiments for 100 times.
In Fig. 3, we demonstrate that the computational cost of
KeyGen algorithm increases near linearly with the number
of DUs, which ranges from 1 to 50. For comparison, we set
m = 10, n = 50. As the key generation time of ABKS-
UR scheme is affected by the number of attributes in access
structure (n = 50) and that of CP-ABKS scheme depends
the number of attributes submitted by DU (m = 10), our
scheme is much more efficient than these two schemes.
In Fig. 4, we show the computational overhead of Enc
algorithm (including ciphertext and index generation opera-
tions), and it increases with the number of data files, which
ranges from 1 to 10000. As CP-ABKS scheme needs addi-
tional (2n + 5)e1 and ABKS-UR scheme needs to conduct
1http://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼enron/
Fig. 3 Computational overhead of KeyGen algorithm
(n + 1) exponentiation operations, our scheme has less
computational burden than other two schemes, but ABKS-
UR scheme outperforms CP-ABKS scheme. Though the
Enc algorithm has more computational overhead than other
algorithms, it will not affect user search experience as its
computational burden exposed on DO is one-time cost.
Therefore, our scheme is feasible and efficient in practice,
especially for the resource-limited DO, such as sensor nodes
and mobile terminals.
We present the computational overhead of Trap algo-
rithm in the aforementioned three schemes in the Fig. 5.
As ABKS-UR scheme can support conjunctive keyword
search and h2 is much more efficient than other operations,
its computational cost remains unchanged. However, the
computational costs of CP-ABKS scheme and our scheme
increase with increasing the number of submitted key-
words. When the number of submitted keywords is over
10, the computational burden of CP-ABKS scheme is heav-
ier than that of ABKS-UR scheme, but our scheme is still
less than ABKS-UR scheme. And when the number of
queried keywords is close to 50, the trapdoor generation
time of our scheme is the same as that ABKS-UR scheme.
However, in practice, the number of queried keywords is
Fig. 4 Computational overhead of Enc algorithm
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Fig. 5 Computational overhead of Trap algorithm
significantly smaller than 50. Thus, our scheme is efficient
and acceptable in practice.
The actual execution time of Search algorithm in above
three schemes is presented in Fig. 6, and we notice that
the ciphertext search time of CP-ABKS scheme and our
scheme vary with the number of submitted keywords, but
the computational overhead of CP-ABKS scheme is slightly
more than that of our scheme. When the number of queried
keywords is over than 20, the computational burden of
ABKS-UR scheme is less than that of CP-ABKS scheme
and our scheme. As the search time of ABKS-UR scheme
in Search algorithm is affected by the number of attributes
in access structure rather than the number of submitted
keywords, the computational cost of ABKS-UR scheme
keeps unchanged. However, in reality, our scheme is still
more efficient than ABKS-UR scheme when the number of
submitted keywords is less than 20.
From above figures we notice that the actual performance
evaluation is in complete accord with theoretical compu-
tation complexity which is shown in Table 3. Except for
the above four algorithms, there exists Verify algorithm in
DOAS scheme, and its computational overhead is 2e1 +4p,
which is acceptable in a broad range of applications. In other
words, our scheme is efficient and feasible in practice.
Fig. 6 Computational overhead of Search algorithm
7 Conclusions
In this paper we propose an efficient DOAS scheme in
which DO can grant access permission according to his
preference rather than the participation of third-party server,
thus the unauthorized accesses can be prevented. Besides,
DOAS scheme removes the secure channel to reduce the
computational costs. Moreover, formal security analysis
proves that DOAS scheme is secure against CPA and CKA
without random oracle. As a further contribution, the empir-
ical experiments over real-world dataset show that DOAS
scheme is much more efficient than the state-of-the-art SE
scheme which is based on ABE. Therefore, DOAS scheme
is efficient and feasible in practice. As part of our future
work, we need to eliminate the defect that DO needs to
remain online, and further improve the search efficiency
with supporting conjunctive keyword search.
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